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American Intellectuals: Their Politics and Status

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET

THE SUPPOSEDLY unhappy plight of the intellectuals in America has been a favorite topic for introspective analysis by many in this occupational category who see themselves as unappreciated by society.¹ On the other hand, some persons, particularly businessmen and conservative politicians, have viewed the intellectuals as excessively critical of traditional American values and as dangerously influential. How accurate are these opposing images?

We shall here consider intellectuals to be all those who create, distribute, and apply *culture*—the symbolic world of man, including art, science, and religion. Within this group, two main levels may be discerned: the hard core, who are creators of culture—scholars, artists, philosophers, authors, some editors, and some journalists; and second, those who distribute what others create—performers in the various arts, most teachers, most reporters. A peripheral group are those who apply culture as part of their jobs—professionals such as physicians and lawyers.

When Europeans speak of the *intelligentsia*, they mean those in all three categories. In America, however, where the university-educated are much more numerous, they do not constitute a distinct class or community, and it is usual to include only the two main categories—the creators and distributors of culture. In this paper, I propose to discuss the political behavior of those engaged in these occupations, and then to suggest some of the underlying factors that seem to account for their political behavior.

The Dominant Politics of the Intellectuals

In the days of McCarthyism, the now defunct journal *Facts Forum* charged the intellectuals as a group with being most vulnerable to Communism, and described them as “lawyers, doctors, bankers, teachers, professors, preachers, writers, and publishers.”² This listing

of supposedly Communist-inclined occupations, while ludicrous, does give an important clue to the nature of the politics of intellectuals and the sources of political anti-intellectualism in America. *Facts Forum* attacked those occupations whose practitioners were university-educated precisely because these professional groups were the most effective opponents of McCarthyism.³ A considerable body of evidence demonstrates that the better educated individuals are, the more likely they are to favor all forms of "noneconomic liberalism," such as civil liberties for unpopular political minorities.⁴ This, of course, was one of the motives for the attack of the extreme right, as represented by *Facts Forum*, on "the American respectables, the socially pedigreed, the culturally acceptable, the certified gentlemen and scholars of the day, dripping with college degrees."⁵

The facts about the politics of American intellectuals are fairly clear. During the twentieth century, the great majority of academics (particularly those in the social sciences), as well as most significant literary figures and most leading journals of opinion, have been opposed to conservative thought and action in political and religious realms. Regarding the latter, quantitative data reporting on the beliefs of the academic profession have been available from before the First World War until the present. In 1913-1914 and again in 1933 James Leuba, a psychologist, studied the religious beliefs of the membership of the sociological, psychological, and historical societies, and of scientists listed in *American Men of Science*, and reported that a majority of the sample of each group denied a belief in God or immortality. Comparable questionnaires completed at the earlier date by 927 students in nine "highly respected" colleges indicated that 90 per cent of the undergraduates affirmed a belief in God. Although we have no equivalent data on nonacademic occupational groups, other studies of American religious behavior suggest that the attitudes of the students conformed to general sentiment more than did those of the professors. Actually, about 55 per cent of all persons fourteen years of age and older were affiliated with churches before World War I, a figure which fell only slightly in the 1930's. Among the members of the American Sociological Society who replied to the questionnaires, the nonacademics were more likely to have religious beliefs than were the faculty members. It is noteworthy that on both occasions the more distinguished professors in each discipline were less identified with religious beliefs than were their less eminent colleagues.⁶

In 1937, a survey conducted in Chicago reported pro-New Deal sentiments among 84 per cent of the professors of social science and 65 per cent of natural-science faculty members, as contrasted with 56 per cent among manual workers, 16 per cent among lawyers, physicians, and dentists, and 13 per cent among engineers. Roughly similar results were obtained by this survey with regard to attitudes on various socioeconomic issues.⁷ Almost two decades later, interviews conducted with a systematic national sampling of over 2000 social scientists teaching in American universities in 1955 revealed that three-quarters were Democrats and that two-thirds had voted for Stevenson in 1952, a year in which nearly half the manual workers and members of trade unions had voted for Eisenhower. As in the case of the two studies of religious belief, this investigation found that the more distinguished professors included an even higher proportion of liberals.⁸

Academics, of course, are not the only group among the intellectuals who strongly support liberal politics. In 1947 a survey conducted by *Time* magazine, based on questionnaires and returned by over 9000 university graduates, asked how they had voted in 1944, and reported large Democratic majorities among teachers, scientists, and practitioners of the arts.⁹ It is significant that, while 60 per cent of the respondents who reported their occupation as "scientist" voted Democratic, 80 per cent of those listed as "engineers" had voted Republican in 1944.¹⁰

Journalism comprises a high proportion of members with liberal political and economic philosophies, as is shown by studies based on interviews. In the mid-'thirties, a study of 104 Washington correspondents, a highly paid elite group, found that only 30 per cent had voted Republican in 1936, while 6 per cent had supported the Communist or Socialist candidate and the large majority had backed Roosevelt. Although the average salary of this group was over \$6000, a considerable income for that period, 40 per cent of these journalists favored government operation of the mines, public utilities, and the railroads, and 56 per cent supported the organization of a reporters' trade union.¹¹ Many of these political attitudes reflected depression conditions; nevertheless, straw votes conducted among reporters in later years on the campaign trains of the Presidential candidates of both parties suggest that as a professional group journalists have remained sympathetic to the Democratic Party and to liberal causes. A more recent survey of another elite group, the for-

eign correspondents in Western Europe, reported that, in the winter of 1953-1954, 58 per cent of those interviewed stated that they favored Stevenson, while 36 per cent supported Eisenhower for re-election.¹²

The arts have contributed heavily to Democratic support. Only 16 people were classified as being employed in "the arts" in the *Time* study of college graduates, but this group was overwhelmingly pro-Roosevelt. Like the journalists, those creative artists who are employed are almost entirely organized within trade unions, and their unions have also shown a strong liberal or left-wing political slant. Other indications of liberal leanings among artists may be seen in the substantial financial backing of the Democratic Party on the part of those employed in the motion-picture industry.¹³

It may, of course, be argued that support of the Democratic Party is not in and of itself evidence of liberal or left-of-center politics, since that party includes many relatively conservative individuals among its ranks. But the available evidence suggests that the support given the party by intellectuals is basically related to the fact that it has been the party of the have-nots and of liberal social reform. Thus, a large part of the membership of what is basically the left wing of the Democratic Party, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), has come from intellectuals, and its strongest sections have been in academic communities. Perhaps even more conclusive evidence that the intellectual is attracted to the ideological left is the fact that the relatively small leftist third parties, both Socialist and Communist, seem to have secured more support from intellectuals than from any other stratum of the population. Thus a study made in 1934 of party registrations in the then strongly Republican Santa Clara County (suburban San Francisco) found that one-quarter of the professional writers had registered as members of the Socialist and Communist parties; only one-third were Republicans.¹⁴ Librarianship, an occupation closely linked with the intellectual world, also shows strong leftist in addition to liberal propensities. In 1948, a study asking a national sample of librarians to list their first choice for President reported that 17 per cent listed minority left-wing candidates.¹⁵ Communist factions have been disproportionately strong in contested elections within trade unions dealing with intellectual occupations, such as the American Newspaper Guild, Artists Equity, and the Radio Writers Guild. And it is no secret that Hollywood was a major source of Communist Party funds in this country.¹⁶

The Communists and their fellow travelers have never been more

than a minority among American intellectuals (regardless of how that minority is defined), although as we have seen they did at times constitute an influential minority during the 'thirties and the 'forties. It is precisely here that the liberal bent of American left-wing intellectuals becomes apparent: most intellectual groups organized to combat Communist influence among the intellectuals have been led by Socialists and somewhat left-wing liberals. The most important such group in recent times, The American Committee for Cultural Freedom, has been under the leadership of Socialists such as Sidney Hook and Norman Thomas, or of men active in the New York Liberal Party, such as George Counts and James T. Farrell.

Thus in general the wide variety of evidence to be adduced concerning the attitudes and political affiliations of writers, practitioners of the arts, journalists, librarians, scientists, and university professors, shows that these intellectual sectors of the middle class have given more support to the Democratic Party and to minority liberal and left-wing parties than has any stratum of the population, in proportion to its size.

The General and Specific Sources of Liberalism

The analysis of the sources of the historic political position of American intellectuals is a more complex problem than is the documentation of the phenomenon itself. Part of the answer lies in the conditions general to the life of the intellectuals in most societies, conditions that account for the patterns of left-wing support by such groups in other countries. Thus Bertrand de Jouvenal has pointed out that there is an inevitable conflict between the values of the business classes and those of creative arts. Business is institutionally committed to giving its clientele what they want. In contrast, the creative artist tends to view the worth of his products independently of their immediate market utility.¹⁷ Since rewards for cultural products in modern capitalist society increasingly depend on a market organized round business norms, the divergent views of the middleman or employer as to creative talent (e.g., Hollywood executives, newspaper owners, book publishers) and the professional norms of the artist are bound to lead either to hostility toward the businessman by the artist who cannot or will not create by the criterion of marketability, or else to feelings of self-deprecation and a sense of self-interested surrender of personal integrity among those who successfully adapt to the market.¹⁸

Although one could discuss other factors among those intrinsic to intellectual occupations and likely to affect the political values of intellectuals everywhere,¹⁹ there are sources for the liberalism of American intellectuals that are specific to this country and its history. Two factors, both resulting from our egalitarian ideology, have been important in this regard. First, the ideology most easily available to American intellectuals historically has been the egalitarian dogmas of the Declaration of Independence; second, the very intellectuals who completely accept the egalitarian implications of the American Creed have felt as a group underprivileged because they have not been accorded the symbols of high status their brethren in Europe receive. Ironically, some of the reasons why American intellectuals do not secure the signs of the respect they crave may derive from the very strength of the egalitarian norms they espouse.

As to the first point, it is a curious fact that there is no really conservative tradition in America—a condition common to many former colonial countries.²⁰ The American Creed evolved out of a prolonged revolution. And Americans, regardless of party, class, or religious persuasion, on the whole *do believe* in their revolutionary creed—unlike those Europeans who live in societies with ancient aristocratic class structures and established churches, in which the forces of conservatism never really accepted the legitimacy of egalitarian democracy even when imposed by revolution.

This means that conservative ideologies that look back to a golden age have never held sway in this country (except to some degree in the South and among some nineteenth-century New England families). Consequently, no conservative “utopia” has ever been counterposed to the egalitarian utopias that have guided our political struggles. The political intellectual, the man of ideas, is nowhere very interested in defending inconsistencies, and every status quo is full of inconsistencies. Only by attacking the limitations of his political and social order can such an intellectual feel he is playing a fruitful creative role. In Europe he has been able to do this either by supporting a reformist utopia, an image of the good society of the future, or by advocating a conservative utopia, usually in the image of a society with traditional values, an Establishment, and a creative aristocratic elite who have no need of flattering the uncreative masses. The ideal society of the reformer is in the future, while that of the conservative is in the past. Each can criticize the present from the vantage point of an image of these “good” societies. And quite often

both dislike the same features of the present, such as the nature of popular culture, which the leftist blames on the institutions of a business society, and which the conservative sees as necessarily flowing from the fact that democracy gives the masses power over taste.²¹

The restrictions of possible ideological choices for American intellectuals has meant that even the conservatively disposed have defined their political ideals in terms of the only available doctrines—those of their revolutionary past—doctrines which true European conservatives have abhorred as the rankest radicalism. In a book written in the early 1930's, unfortunately almost unknown, Leon Samson²² pointed out amazing parallels between the language used by certain important American businessmen and Republican political leaders to describe the nature and objectives of American society and the statements of certain Socialist and Communist leaders from Marx to Stalin. Samson argued that a principal cause for the failure of the socialist movement in America has been the fact that the symbolic goals of socialism are so closely identical with those of Americanism that Americans feel no need to adopt a "foreign" version of Americanism. American conservative politicians have not had an ideology, they have simply attempted to prevent change;²³ or, like the "modern" Republicans of today, they have competed with liberals in seeking egalitarian reforms they could espouse, thus justifying themselves in the light of the American Creed. American conservative parties, in fact, have demonstrated their own liberalism in noneconomic spheres by waging a more consistent fight for Negro rights than did the pre-Roosevelt Democrats.

The second major source of the political leftism of American intellectuals, as already mentioned, derives from their seemingly almost universal feeling that they are an underprivileged group, that they are not high on the ladder of social recognition, income, and power, as compared with businessmen and professionals.²⁴ In a recent study, social scientists teaching in universities were asked how typical businessmen, Congressmen, or college trustees would rank professors, in contrast with "the manager of a branch bank, an account executive in an advertising agency, and a lawyer." The majority of those answering thought that businessmen and Congressmen would put them (the teachers) in the last place. The replies were most confident as to the status of professors in the eyes of college trustees, but even so almost half the respondents with opinions said that the

“average” trustee would rank them either third or fourth. This low self-image encourages professors (and, I would suggest, other intellectuals) to pursue the same political path as other “deprived” groups the world over in supporting those political parties that attack the existing distribution of privilege, and in an antagonism to those who are “over-rewarded”—the business classes. The data clearly show that feelings of low status are closely correlated with the advocacy of liberal politics. “The Democratic voters are consistently more inclined to think that nobody loves a professor.”²⁵

The Real Status of the Intellectuals

It is a surprising fact, therefore, that the image of the American intellectual as held by his fellow citizens is quite different from what he himself thinks they hold. While he may feel himself neglected and scorned, his work poorly valued by the community, the community itself places him fairly high when polled on the relative status of occupations. In one such study of the ranks of ninety-six occupations, conducted in 1947 by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago, college professors ranked above every nonpolitical position except that of physicians; artists, musicians in a symphony orchestra, and authors ranked almost as high.²⁶ Essentially, this study suggests that those in the intellectual occupations enjoy about the same prestige in America as do important businessmen, bankers, and corporation directors.²⁷ In 1950 a second national opinion survey reported similar results. This study asked people to place various jobs in the “upper, middle, working, or lower classes.” Professors came out fourth among twenty-four categories, and 38 per cent of those polled placed them definitely in the “upper” class.²⁸

It may be argued that national surveys reporting the opinions of the total population are not significant, since what counts is the opinion of the elite. The social science professors interviewed for *The Academic Mind* considered that big businessmen and high government officials simply do not respect intellectuals. Yet studies that have compared the differential ratings made by people from different classes indicate that those in high social and economic positions actually think far better of intellectual pursuits than do those in the working and lower classes.²⁹

Perhaps the best evidence that intellectual occupations, particularly college teaching, do enjoy a high status in America derives

paradoxically from the same professors cited above, the majority of whom reported that they thought their occupation would be ranked relatively low by businessmen and politicians. These professors, who constitute a good sample of university social scientists, turn out to come from "relatively high status . . . family backgrounds," as the data in Table I indicate.

TABLE I
Social Origins of University Social Scientists
Source: Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<i>Father's Occupation</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
Teacher	8
Other professional	23
Managerial	25
White collar and small business	15
Farmer	13
Manual laborer	15
No information given	1
	100 (2451)

Though professors prefer to believe they are undervalued by people outside the intellectual community, the fact that they are able to attract to their ranks men from relatively privileged origins suggests that their occupation is highly valued. Almost half the respondents have fathers who are in managerial posts or professions other than teaching. Only 15 per cent are the children of manual workers. A comparison of these data with those reported on different samples of the American business elite, the heads of the largest corporations, indicates that the origins of both groups are roughly similar.³⁰ Actually, the comparison may be unfair to the academic profession, since the sample of college professors is drawn from all institutions of higher learning in the United States, whereas the professors at the better institutions (which are on the average the larger schools) come from higher socioeconomic backgrounds: 62 per cent of those at very large schools (above 9000 students) are from managerial or professional families, as contrasted with 49 per cent at very small schools (700 or below); two-thirds of the social scientists at private nondenominational schools are from high-status backgrounds, as compared with 44 per cent at institutions with a religious affiliation or at teachers colleges.³¹ Since the social sciences are not generally

those disciplines with the highest prestige within a university, it is likely that the social origins of humanists and natural scientists are even higher. But the facts we already have as to the attitudes of the general population and the family backgrounds of social scientists constitute a powerful argument for the thesis that academic and other intellectual occupations in the United States are high in social prestige.

The Contradictions of Real and Presumed Status

Since the American intellectual's self-image as one of low status seems to be one source of his leftism, and since the facts contradict this appraisal, the question naturally follows: why then does the intellectual feel that he is looked down on?

I suspect that in large measure his feelings of inferiority derive from his glorified conception of the status of the European intellectual and from his using the European situation as a comparison.³² Anyone who has ever been in a discussion about the life of an intellectual in this country knows that sooner or later someone will remark that in England, Germany, France, or Italy a writer, painter, composer, or professor really counts. There, such a man is recognized by the public and by the political and economic elites.³³

It is certainly true that there is a difference between the European and the American treatment of the intellectual. This difference is no more or less than the difference between a fairly rigid class society and a society that emphasizes equality. In Europe, open or apparent deference is given *all* those with higher status, whether engineers, factory owners, or professors, whereas in this country it is not given anyone in such categories to the degree it is abroad.³⁴ As A. G. Nicholas has pointed out in comparing the situation of the American and the British intellectual, the latter "has been in some degree sheltered by his very position in what Bagehot called a 'deferential society.' Not *very* deferential to him, perhaps; less deferential than to the landowner, the administrator, the soldier, the clergyman or the lawyer, over all of whom the protective gabardine of the appellation 'gentleman' has fallen more inclusively, with fewer loose ends sticking out. Nevertheless the [British] intellectual has shared in it too, whether he was behaving as a rebel or as a hired apologist."³⁵

Obviously intellectuals receive a gratifying social deference in many parts of Europe—but so do all positions of high status. What the American intellectual who envies his European brother fails to

see is that he is really objecting to the egalitarianism of the United States, rather than to a lower evaluation of his occupation by its citizens. Unconsciously, he thinks in European terms, adopting the criteria of conservative middle- and upper-class European travelers and *émigrés* in America who have found American egalitarianism distasteful.³⁶

The Effects of Isolation and Low Income

Two other sources of the low self-appraisal and consequently leftist politics of American intellectuals that do not follow directly from American egalitarian values are the seeming isolation of intellectuals from other sections of the elite (particularly their lack of direct contact with political power) as compared with that of European intellectuals, and their income, as contrasted with that of business executives and professional men.

It is true that the average American intellectual has less direct contact with other sections of the elite, particularly with men who wield political power, than does the average European intellectual. Why is this true? The fact is that there are, in absolute as well as proportionate terms, more intellectuals in America, and they are more widely dispersed geographically than in any other country. This matter of numbers can be quite important. For example, in 1929 *all ten* professors of economics in Australia met and told the government they believed it would be disastrous for the country to go off the gold standard. The Labor government of the day was not happy about this, but it felt it should not move against the "experts." There are far too many such experts in America for them to have such a corporate influence. In this country there are more than fifteen hundred colleges and universities, while Great Britain has about fifteen, West Germany less than twenty, Norway one, Denmark two, Sweden four. In the United States, the Boston area has about 9000 teachers of college and university rank, and the northern California area of which San Francisco is the center has 14,000. In Greater New York City alone there are well over 20,000 persons teaching in about forty institutions of higher learning.

No city in the world approaches New York in the number of intellectuals employed in publishing houses, magazines, and other intellectual enterprises, in addition to those in universities. While New York may be said to be the intellectual capital of the United States, there are important groups of intellectuals scattered round the

country whose combined number is far greater than those in or adjacent to New York.³⁷ Important schools of painters and writers exist in various parts of the country, from Seattle and Los Angeles on the West Coast to New Mexico, New Orleans, Chicago, and Boston. The two leading universities in the country (as judged by faculty caliber ranked by authorities in the various academic disciplines) are located in metropolitan Boston and San Francisco.

The sheer numbers of intellectuals in the urban centers, as well as the enormous size of the country, necessarily limit the extent to which intellectuals in the same field are acquainted with one another, let alone with those in other fields such as politics or business. Academics in large cities often know well only those within their own disciplines; and I can testify from direct experience that social relations among people in the same specialization in different universities in the same large community are rare. There are over sixty historians employed full time on the faculty of Columbia University. The Berkeley faculty harbors more than thirty sociologists, more than are employed by all the British or Canadian universities. Groups of artists, *avant-garde* writers, and those employed in publishing houses exist in many cities, but their membership is often too large to permit much contact with other groups. The relative isolation of the American college professor from all groups, intellectual or other, is borne out by the Lazarsfeld-Thielens study of social scientists. Over three-fifths of the respondents (62 per cent) reported that "their main social contacts are confined to the university," a figure that rises to above 70 per cent among those at the more distinguished colleges and universities.³⁸ Conversely, in countries with a smaller elite, there is necessarily much intermingling. As Irving Kristol, who has edited *Encounter* in London and *Commentary* and *The Reporter* in New York, has put it, "What has astonished me, and what astonishes any American, is the extent to which almost all British intellectuals are cousins. . . . In America it is otherwise, to put it mildly. . . . It is by no means unimaginable that the senior editors of *The New Yorker* should never have met the senior editors of *Time*."³⁹ Dwight Macdonald, whose writing experience also includes both cities, has commented, "As an alumnus of both of these magazines, I can testify this is accurate; intellectual circles in New York are neither concentric, interlocking, nor tangential, and one knows 'personally' . . . only a small proportion of the authors whose books and articles one reads. The London intellectual community is much broader, including busi-

nessmen, lawyers, and even publishers, even Members of Parliament."⁴⁰

The government of the United States, even when the Republicans are in office, does employ and consult professors and other intellectuals. According to John Fischer, "The Eisenhower administration employs more professors than the New Deal ever did."⁴¹ (The Republican need for intellectuals may be seen in the fact that the two professors who have recently written sympathetic appraisals of the party, Arthur Larson and Malcolm Moos, have since been employed as Presidential aides in the White House.) The great majority, of course, are unlikely to be thus singled out, but I would guess that as many, if not more, professors and other intellectuals are employed or consulted at high levels by the state and federal governments as in most European nations. It is only when the comparison is made in terms of proportion between one class in one country and that in another that Americans rate lower—there are just so many more of them.⁴²

Thus, while the size and decentralization of American intellectual life remove the individual intellectual from contact with other sections of the elite and give him a sense of deprivation when he compares his situation with what he conceives to be that of his British or French counterpart, an analysis of the causes of this deprivation do not justify the conclusion drawn by many intellectuals that they are being ostracized or rejected by nonintellectuals.⁴³

Another point, and a very sore one, in the negative image the American intellectual has of himself is his income. Compared with businessmen and independent professional men, he is impecunious.⁴⁴ His argument goes like this: people are paid according to what they are worth, and consequently lower pay implies lower value. This syllogism omits the important fact that there are really two income structures in modern Western countries, the private one and the public one. The public position of high status is always more poorly paid than is a corresponding private one. A lawyer at the peak of his profession, as for example, a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, earns a good deal less than does many a corporation lawyer in private practice. When Eisenhower's cabinet officers left private employment, they had to take considerable cuts in salary.

To consider a comparable group of intellectuals, the leading professors at major American universities earn salaries that compare favorably with those paid in all but the very summit of high-level

posts in government or other nonprofit institutions. Thus the minimum salary for full professors at certain good universities is at present \$12,000 for the academic year and many earn above this minimum. Many professors make considerably more money on the side, in consulting fees from corporations and governments, in fees for articles, lectures, and books. Data in the study of social-science professors cited previously show that 62 per cent of all in this field have outside sources of income, and that the more productive faculty members (earning presumably the highest regular salaries) are most likely to secure extra income. It is true, of course, that many professors could earn more in private industry, but this very fact disproves the contention of those who claim that their talents are undervalued. The truth is that professors, like the lawyers who become judges or elective officials rather than corporation counselors, really believe that the noneconomic rewards of the job are better than monetary gains.

The Political Success of Intellectuals

The two defeats of Adlai Stevenson have been taken by many intellectuals as indication of the inability of American intellectuals to play an effective role in politics. But it is doubtful whether his defeats by the charismatic personality of Eisenhower prove more as to the effectiveness of an "intellectual" approach to campaigning than did Stevenson's success in his 1948 race for Governor of Illinois, when he ran 400,000 votes ahead of the "man of the people," Harry Truman. Actually, on the level of party politics and electoral office, intellectuals do amazingly well. In the United States Senate there are fourteen former members of college faculties (eleven Democrats and three Republicans), while more than half the remaining Senators have *earned* advanced degrees.⁴⁵

The ability of American intellectuals to win office is especially striking, given the fact that the American electoral and party system, with its lack of central party control of the candidates, makes it difficult for men to obtain party nominations unless they come up via machine politics and enjoy the backing of local party officials. In much of Europe, on the other hand, the officers of centralized parties can confer nominations on party intellectuals. Few American intellectuals are prepared to follow the path of direct participation in local politics, as has been successfully done by Paul Douglas, Richard Neuberger, Ernest Gruening, or Hubert Humphrey.

Anti-intellectualism and American Values

We have seen that much of the self-deprecating image projected by the American intellectual to justify his feelings of alienation from his society turns out to be invalid. This does not mean, of course, that there have not been strong anti-intellectual tendencies in this country, and these further account for the continuing lack of a conservative politics on the part of intellectuals. Anti-intellectualism in this sense does not imply that intellectuals are historically a low-status group in America. As will be seen, the opposite may be true. This source of alienation stems in part from democratic aspects of American society, from the lack of hereditary aristocracy with a tradition of upper-class behavior, and from the early history of adult suffrage.

The absence of an aristocratic class and the presence of an egalitarian ideal have meant also that for a long period this country lacked the respect for cultural activities developed by traditional aristocracies as part of their way of life, and taken over by much of the European bourgeoisie as they sought to emulate the role of the class they replaced. For much of the nineteenth century, particularly the second half, the rise to dominance within the economy of literally hundreds of self-made millionaires brought into prominence and civic power individuals who lacked the social graces and cultural interests of the established upper classes. The self-made man tends to emphasize the importance of material success and of conspicuous material possessions, and to deprecate seemingly nonproductive activities. He takes pride in economic and technological advance. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, many American intellectuals such as Henry Adams felt outcast in a world dominated by such men.⁴⁶

During the twentieth century the vulgarities of taste introduced by the so-called "robber barons" began to decline. Their scions gave rise to the *Social Register*, and they have attempted to create an American aristocracy. Digby Baltzell in a recently published study of the Philadelphia upper class has well described the emergence in this century of elite private schools such as Groton (which have come to play a part comparable to that of Eton and Harrow in Britain), the gradual centralization of upper-class education in a few universities, the codification of upper-class membership in the *Social Register*, and the conversion of high-status families to Episcopalian-

ism.⁴⁷ All these trends have served to reduce, if not to eliminate, the type of materialistic anti-intellectualism which disturbed Henry Adams.

Nevertheless, as overt anti-intellectualism stemming from the social situation of the *nouveaux riches* declined, a new source of anti-intellectualism emerged. The antagonism to American culture as dominated by business, which had led many nineteenth-century intellectuals to withdraw completely from any concern with politics or public affairs, turned in the twentieth century to the support of liberal and left-wing politics, first Progressivism and Wilson's New Freedom, later Marxism or the New Deal.⁴⁸ Marcus Cunliffe suggests that World War I, "along with the Russian Revolution . . . finally proved to the American *avant-garde* that they knew better than their society. It is not too wild to say that 1917, the year of revolution and mutiny, also marked a cultural revolution in America—a movement that was to adopt the vocabulary of Marx together with that of Freud."⁴⁹

The emergence of the intellectual into the political battle as an active partisan brought with it anti-intellectualism as a line of counterattack by the harassed political and religious conservatives. The long history of attacks on the special views of intellectuals, going back to the early nineteenth century, reflects in large part the fact that the United States has the longest continuous history of democratic politics and adult suffrage.⁵⁰ It is clearly necessary for men in politics to try to demolish the strength of the views of the opposition, and the very fact that the intellectuals have always claimed that their superior education and intelligence make their views important has tempted those who disagreed with them, in both Europe and America, to resort to anti-intellectualism.⁵¹ Nowhere do the masses have any real understanding of or sympathy for the problems of intellectual life, and they can be roused against the intellectuals as part of their general resentment of the advantages of the more privileged and powerful. Friedrich Engels has noted how in the early days of the European socialist movement it was possible for anarchists and other left-wing opponents of Marx to foster among communist workers an "ineradicable suspicion against any schoolmaster, journalist, and any man generally who was not a manual worker as being an 'erudite' who was out to exploit them."⁵² David Riesman has correctly noted that political anti-intellectualism may be regarded as a form of the "class struggle," that it reflects the fact that various groups

“feel threatened by . . . the growth of intellectualism,” that the powerful enemy is “no longer only bankers, lawyers, drummers [but also] professors, teachers, writers, and artists.”⁵³

This point suggests anew that the leftist politics of the intellectuals in America does not arise from an actual low status. If political anti-intellectualism is evidence that intellectuals have low status, then the persistent attacks on bankers, Wall Street brokers, and railroad magnates in American history would be evidence that they also are low-status groups—and this is clearly not the case. Attacks on any group often indicate they are regarded as high-status groups, and reflect a kind of populist antagonism to any elite.

A Breakdown of the Liberal Syndrome?

This analysis of the sources of contemporary anti-intellectualism and of the dominant politics of American intellectuals has produced some curious paradoxes. I have argued that anti-intellectualism has been particularly widespread among conservatives because intellectuals have not been distributed more or less equally among the political parties. Conservatism has been virtually eliminated by the nature of the American Creed as a real alternative in the minds of American intellectuals, who have come to regard themselves as underprivileged in comparison with their European counterparts. This feeling of deprivation adds to their reformist zeal, which in turn provokes attacks on them by conservatives, thereby increasing support for left-of-center intellectual politics.⁵⁴

Such a cycle, which would seem indefinitely to keep American intellectuals on the left side and to incite right-wing groups against them, has shown some signs of breaking down in the last few years. As a group, American intellectuals appear to have shifted toward the center, although most probably they remain to the left of that position, while a significant minority have become conservative. There are many circumstances underlying this shift, but one of the most important seems the prolonged postwar prosperity. Another is the reaction of liberal leftist intellectuals in America as elsewhere to the rise of Communism as a main threat to freedom. Faced with a society far worse than the one now existing in the West, but also one which claims to be fulfilling the values of the American and the French Revolutions, such intellectuals, including many of the Socialists among them, for the first time in recent history now are moving

toward a conservative ideology which allows them to defend an existing or a past society against those who argue for a future utopia. Like Burke, they have come to look for sources of stability, rather than of change. The very social classes which the reformist intellectual saw as the carriers of the good society—the lower classes, especially the workers—back the new despotism, not only the despotism of the Left, but, as McCarthyism and Peronism have shown, often that of the “radical right.” Furthermore, the success of non-authoritarian forms of leftism itself—the New Deal in this country, democratic socialism in the Commonwealth and Scandinavia—has served to remove programs for economic reform from the category of utopias to that of a reality, whatever its imperfections and inconsistencies.

While changing political events have everywhere destroyed the utopias of the democratic Left and turned their movements into parties of the status quo, the prolonged prosperity with its concomitant improvement of the position of the workers and the intellectuals has reduced the visible rationale for an intense concern with economic reform. The political issue of the 1950's has become one of freedom versus Communism. In that struggle many socialist and liberal intellectuals find that they identify themselves with continuing institutions. This identification with the established order comes hard to those intellectuals who feel called upon to reject conventional anachronisms, and results in a feeling of malaise which takes the form of a complaint that everyone, including the intellectuals, is too conformist. Many American liberals in the 1950's know they should like and defend the society in which they live; nevertheless they have the uneasy feeling that they are betraying their obligation as intellectuals to attack and criticize. Their solution to this dilemma is to go on feeling allied to the Left, to think of themselves as liberals, even socialists, but to vote the Democratic ticket and basically to withdraw from active involvement or interest in politics and to concentrate on their work, whether it be poetry or scholarship.

Finally, it is important to note that the evidence does not support the assumption on the part of the few who still remain on the extreme Left that McCarthyism or other forms of intimidation have silenced the radicals and created a frightened or bought group of conformists. The survey of the attitudes of American social scientists supplies convincing evidence to indicate that those who thought the spirit of the academic profession had been crushed by McCarthyism were

wrong. In general, the liberal social scientists stood up for the rights of unpopular minorities and continued to exercise their right of free expression, even though they felt apprehensive of threats to their intellectual activity. As Lazarsfeld and Thielens remark about the behavior of the social-science professors they interviewed, "There is indeed widespread apprehension among these social science teachers, but in general it is hardly of a paralyzing nature; the heads of these men and women are 'bloody but unbowed.'"⁵⁵

The courage and liberalism of the university professor is in fact constantly reinforced as a result of the high degree of "in-group" social relations. "While outside forces such as legislative committees may have harsh and definite means to do him damage, he cannot underestimate the subtle deprivations to which his immediate professional environment could subject him."⁵⁶ Men live in small communities, not simply in the great society, and the small community both reinforces its own attitudes and punishes deviations from group norms. Thus, the liberal consensus within the academic community has served to intimidate conservatives much more than outside prying and criticism have inhibited those left-of-center.⁵⁷ Yet the larger social forces that push the intellectual community as a whole in a conservative direction may in the future also reduce this internal consensus on liberal political values, and allow the release of a more latent conservatism than has been apparent.

Perhaps even more significant evidence that the decline of leftist intellectual deviation in America is not primarily a result of coercion may be supplied by a comparison of the situation in the United States and that in other Western nations in which the pressures linked with internal-security programs have been much less. It is noteworthy that the reconciliation between imperfect democratic society and leftist intellectuals is similar in a number of countries.⁵⁸ The existence of a vicious totalitarianism that bases itself on the working class, together with the varied effects of prolonged prosperity, have challenged the strength of reformist utopias among American intellectuals. This change in political attitudes may bring a sharp reduction in the expressions of anti-intellectualism, even as it means a decline of the traditional alienation of the intellectuals.

Only time will tell whether a permanent change in the relationship of the American intellectual to his society is in process. In spite of the powerful conservatizing forces, there will still remain the inherent tendencies to oppose the status quo. As Edward Shils has written

recently, "In all societies, even those in which the intellectuals are noted for their conservatism, the diverse paths of creativity, as well as an inevitable tendency toward negativism, impel a partial rejection of the prevailing system of cultural values. The very process of elaboration and development . . . of the potentialities inherent in a 'system' of cultural values . . . involves a measure of rejection."⁵⁹ Any status quo embodies rigidities and dogmatisms which intellectuals have an inalienable right of attacking, whether from the standpoint of moving back toward traditional values or forward to the achievement of the egalitarian dream.

REFERENCES

1. This paper is part of an investigation of the political behavior of diverse strata which is supported by a grant from the Behavioral Sciences Division of the Ford Foundation. It is part of a book on *The Social Bases of Politics*, which will be published in January 1960 by Doubleday & Company. "The Egghead Looks at Himself," an earlier version, was published in *The New York Times Magazine*, 17 November 1957. I would like to acknowledge advice and assistance from Robert Alford, Amitai Etzioni, and Philip Rieff.
2. *Facts Forum Radio Program*, No. 57.
3. For further discussion of this point see S. M. Lipset, "The Sources of the Radical Right," in Daniel Bell, ed., *The New American Right* (New York: Criterion Books, 1956), pp. 210-212.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 226-227, Note 38.
5. *Facts Forum Radio Program*, *op. cit.*
6. James H. Leuba, *The Belief in God and Immortality* (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1921), pp. 219-287; and James H. Leuba, *The Reformation of the Churches* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950). For an analysis of trends in religious belief among the total population see S. M. Lipset, "Religion in America," *Columbia University Forum*, Winter 1958-1959, 2: 17-21.
7. Arthur Kornhauser, "Attitudes of Economic Groups," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1938, 2: p. 264.
8. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind* (Chicago: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958), pp. 14-17.
9. This study is reported in Eric Haveman and Patricia West, *They Went to College* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952). Occupational analyses of political behavior which are not reported in the book were made from original data. I would like to acknowledge with appreciation the courtesy of the research department of *Time* for permitting such secondary analysis.
10. Comparable findings concerning the strong conservatism and Republicanism of engineers are reported in Arthur Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 264, and Arthur Kornhauser, "Analysis of 'Class' Structure of Contemporary American Society," in George W. Hartman and Theodore Newcomb, eds., *Industrial Conflict* (New York: The Cordon Company, 1939), p. 255.

11. Leo Rosten, *The Washington Correspondents* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1937), pp. 342-353.
12. Theodore E. Kruglak, *The Foreign Correspondents, A Study of the Men and Women Reporting for the American Information Media in Western Europe* (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1955), pp. 87-89.
13. Louise Overacker, "Presidential Campaign Funds in 1936," *American Political Science Review*, 1937, 31: 485; and "Presidential Campaign Funds in 1944," *American Political Science Review*, 1945, 39: 916.
14. H. D. Anderson and P. E. Davidson, *Ballots and the Democratic Class Struggle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1943), p. 119.
15. This study is reported in Alice I. Bryan, *The Public Librarian: A Report of the Public Library Inquiry* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952). The data dealing with political choice are not included in the printed version of the report, and were secured from a mimeographed version of the same study.
16. John Cogley, *Report on Blacklisting: Vol. I, Movies*, (New York: Fund for the Republic, 1956), pp. 24-46; and *Vol. II, Radio and Television*, pp. 142-162. For a detailed discussion of Communist influence among American intellectuals, see Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, *The American Communist Party. A Critical History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), "The Intellectuals Turn Left," pp. 273-318; see also Daniel Bell, "Marxian Socialism in the United States," in Donald Egbert *et al*, eds., *Socialism and American Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 351-365.
17. Bertrand de Jouvenal, "The Treatment of Capitalism by Continental Historians," in F. A. Hayek, ed., *Capitalism and the Historians* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 118-120. Talcott Parsons has urged the view that there is a basic conflict between the values of business and those of all professions, e.g., law, architecture, medicine, and so forth: "The dominant keynote of the modern economic system is almost universally held to be the high degree of free play which it gives to the pursuit of self-interest. . . . But by contrast with business in this interpretation the professions are marked by 'disinterestedness.' The professional man is not thought of as engaging in the pursuit of his personal profit, but in performing services to his patients or clients, or to impersonal values like the advancement of science" (Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* [Chicago: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1949], p. 186). It should be noted that Parsons does not relate this conflict to any specific political consequence.
18. The two studies of journalists cited earlier both call attention to the fact that the majority of reporters interviewed disagreed with the policies of their newspapers, and felt it necessary to "slant their news stories to reflect the wishes of their superiors" (Leo Rosten, *op. cit.*, p. 351; Theodore E. Kruglak, *op. cit.*, pp. 100, 102). An English study reports that the pressures for a Royal Commission on the Press after 1945 "arose from a desire to protect the intellectual freedom and integrity of journalists from the assaults of their employers" (Roy Lewis and Angus Maude, *The English Middle Classes* [London: Phoenix House, 1949], p. 179).

19. Many writers have suggested that specific intellectual occupations are associated with particular brands of politics. It has been argued that the social scientists are "attracted to the left" (Theodore Geiger, *Aufgabe und Stellung der Intelligenz in der Gesellschaft*, [Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1949], p. 124); that Marxism has "a special appeal for the scientist" (Helmut Plessner, "Ideological Tendencies Among Academic Thinkers," Congress for Cultural Freedom, *Science and Freedom* [London: Secker and Warburg, 1955], p. 178); that historians tend to be conservatives (*loc. cit.*, and Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* [New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936], pp. 119-122). A summary of many early hypotheses differentiating the politics of different groups of intellectuals may be found in Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (New York: Hearst's International Library, 1915), pp. 256-257.
20. See Louis Hartz, *Liberal Political Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1955). "The ironic flaw in American liberalism lies in the fact that we have never had a real conservative tradition" (*ibid.*, p. 57).
21. See Gertrude Himmelfarb, "American Democracy and European Critics" (*The Twentieth Century*, 1952, 151: 320-327) for a critique of the viewpoint of Socialist intellectuals concerning popular culture.
22. Leon Samson, *Towards a United Front* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1933).
23. "With high [intellectual] conservatism . . . excluded by [American] history, all we have left is practical conservatism — the conservatism, not of the professors, but of the industrialists, the financiers, and the politicians" (Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Burke in America," *Encounter*, October 1955, p. 79).
24. Melvin Seeman reports in a recent study based on intensive and unstructured interviews with forty assistant professors in the social sciences and the humanities that "these intellectuals use the language and mechanisms of minority status to describe themselves and their situation." See "The Intellectual and the Language of Minorities," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1958, 64: 27. David Riesman points out that "intellectuals, who, for whatever reason, choose to regard themselves as victimized contribute to the very pressures they deplore. These pressures are not so strong as alleged; thinking that strong helps make them become so" (David Riesman, "Some Observations on Intellectual Freedom," *The American Scholar*, 1953-1954, 23: 14).
25. P. F. Lazarsfeld and W. Thielens, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 11-17.
26. National Opinion Research Center, "Jobs and Occupations," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., *Class, Status and Power* (Chicago: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1953), pp. 412-414.
27. It is interesting to note that studies made in different countries and at different times indicate that the relative prestige of occupations is everywhere similar. Two sociologists, Alex Inkeles and Peter Rossi, have compared the results completed in Japan, Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Australia, and among a sample of Russian "defectors," and they conclude that occupations receive approximately the same rank in each country (Inkeles and Rossi, "National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1956, 61: 339). Later studies completed in Brazil, the

Philippines, Denmark, and the Netherlands show similar results. Two comparable American studies of the prestige of twenty-five different occupations, one completed in the mid-'twenties, and the other in 1947, found almost identical rankings at both times. Essentially, all these studies indicate that occupations which require high levels of educational attainment (intellectuals and professionals) or which command considerable power (business elite and politics) are ranked high everywhere. For discussion and references see S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), pp. 14, 111.

28. Richard Centers, "Social Class, Occupation, and Imputed Belief," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1953, 58: 546.
29. See John D. Campbell, *Subjective Aspects of Occupational Status* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1952).
30. See Lipset and Bendix, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-137, for a summary of the various business-elite studies.
31. Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 26.
32. "In Emerson's day professors and their fellow intellectuals had not come to be regarded as a special group; they were not then, nor have they ever come to be, looked up to, rewarded, and honored as in Europe" (Merle Curti, "Intellectuals and Other People," *The American Historical Review*, 1955, 60: 260). It may be that the grass always looks greener elsewhere, particularly to intellectuals who want to prove it is so, and who as important foreign travelers are often involved in exchanges with many sections of the native elite whom they rarely meet regularly at home. Thus, writing in the 1880's, James Bryce tells us that intellectual eminence in America "receives, I think, more respect than anywhere in Europe, except possibly in Italy, where the interest in learned men, or poets, or artists, seems to be greater than anywhere else in Europe. A famous writer or divine is known by name by a far greater number of persons in America than would know a similar person in any European country. He is one of the glories of the country" (James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* [Toronto: The Copp Clark Pub. Co., Ltd., 1891], Vol. II, p. 621). More recently Raymond Aron, who believes that, all things considered, the position of the British intellectual is superior to that of the French, nevertheless states: "English writers of the *avant-garde* . . . are overcome with rapture when they come to Paris. . . . They at once develop a passionate interest in politics. . . . The last article of Jean-Paul Sartre is a political event, or at least it is greeted as such by a circle of people which, though narrow, is convinced of its own importance." This impression which the English, and need it be added American, intellectuals have of the political influence of their French brethren is, according to Aron, superficial and wrong (Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals* [New York: Doubleday & Co., 1957], p. 218).
33. A French analyst of American intellectuals has recently written: "It seems to me that the attitude of the American intellectual in comparison with his European counterpart is based on frustration and an inferiority complex. I am continually meeting people who tell me that the intellectual in Europe enjoys a position which, if not happier, is at least more dignified than that of

- the intellectual in America" (R. L. Bruckberger, "An Assignment for Intellectuals," *Harper's*, February 1956, p. 69).
34. "One thing and perhaps one thing only, may be asserted with confidence. There is no rank in America, that is to say, no external and recognized stamp, marking one man as entitled to any social privileges, or to deference and respect from others. No man is entitled to think himself better than his fellows, or to expect any exceptional consideration to be shown by them to him" (James Bryce, *op. cit.*, p. 168). For an elaboration of these ideas on the subject to American egalitarianism, one which attempts to show how the elaborate efforts of upper-status Americans to establish distinctions of family rank result from the strength of the egalitarian ideology, see S. M. Lipset, "Social Trends in America," in Lyman Bryson, ed., *A Concise Guide to Knowledge* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., in press).
 35. A. G. Nicholas, "Intellectuals and Politics in U.S.A.," *Occidente*, 1954, 10: 47. Another source of variation in the status accorded intellectuals in Europe and America comes from the differences in numbers. The title "professor" is held by close to 200,000 people in the United States and by a few thousand at most in the larger European states. This partially flows from the fact of a smaller number of universities in Europe, a point to be discussed later, and partly because Europeans limit the title "professor" to a few men in each field per university, often just one. As John D. Hicks pointed out: "In this country we have gradations — assistant professors, associate professors, full professors — and they are all professors. . . . But in the Old World it is different. There one finds no gradations. A man is a professor, or he is not a professor, and if he is a professor, that puts him on a pedestal of some eminence. Most of the teaching staff of an Old World university are not professors at all, and can never hope to become professors" (John D. Hicks, "The American Professor in Europe," *Pacific Spectator*, 1952, 6: 432).
 36. "With his deep sense of class and status, integration in American society is not easy for the *émigré*. The skilled engineer or physician who, after long years of internship, flunking license exams, washing dishes or laboratory floors, finally establishes himself in his profession, discovers that he does not enjoy the same exalted status that he would have had in the old country. I met several Croatian doctors in the Los Angeles area who were earning \$25,000 to \$35,000 a year, but still felt declassed" (Bogdan Raditsa, "Clash of Two Immigrant Generations," *Commentary*, January 1958, 25: 12).
 37. "In the U.S., the political people are in Washington, the publishing and theatre people in New York, the movie people in Los Angeles, while the professors and the press are everywhere. (Most Englishmen I have met are not *really* aware that America has no national press, and that the overwhelming majority of university professors live in small towns.) It is quite possible for a man to edit a magazine with over a half-million readers and never to have met anyone of distinction in politics, the drama or music" (Irving Kristol, "Table Talk," *Encounter*, October 1955, 5: 60). (Emphasis in original.)
 38. Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.
 39. Irving Kristol, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61. Kristol has edited *Encounter* in London, and *Commentary* and *The Reporter* in New York.

40. Dwight Macdonald, "Amateur Journalism," *Encounter*, November 1956, 7: 19. For later comments by Macdonald on the same subject, see his letter, "Politics and Partisans," *Columbia University Forum*, Fall 1958, 2: 3.
41. John Fischer, "The Editor's Easy Chair," *Harper's*, March 1958, p. 18.
42. It has also been suggested that the separation of the political capital, Washington, from the intellectual capital, New York, likewise contributes to the feelings of isolation from political power on the part of many intellectuals. "The only type of intellectual who is likely to congregate in Washington is . . . one who has decided to make politics his full time business" (A. G. Nicholas, *op. cit.*, p. 44).
43. It is interesting to note in this connection that the French sociologist, Raymond Aron, attempting to explain the allegiance of a large section of the French intellectuals to Communism in spite of their high status, argues that they feel isolated from power, and legitimately so. "Most of the [French] intellectuals who take an interest in politics are embittered because they feel they have been defrauded of what was their due. Whether docile or rebellious, they seem to be preaching in the wilderness. . . . In the United States, in Great Britain, even in Germany, ideas and personnel never cease to circulate between the economists and the managerial circles of banking and industry, between these and the higher ranks of the civil service, between the serious press, the universities and the government. Most French businessmen have never met an economist, and until recently they tended — confidentially — to despise the species. French civil servants are totally indifferent to the advice of scholars, and journalists have few contacts with either. . . . In this respect no other ruling class is as badly organized as the French" (Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-221).
44. "Writers occupy a peculiar position in the class structure of American society: they compose what sociologists would call an out-group or rather a collection of such groups. . . . Their incomes are smaller on the average than those of doctors and attorneys, larger than those of clergymen, and roughly equal to those of college professors." See "Prophets Without Honour? The Public Status of American Writers," *The Times Literary Supplement*, 17 September 1954, p. liv. But Raymond Aron tells us that in France, some intellectuals "cast their eyes longingly across the Atlantic, where certain specialists of the written word, whom one would hesitate to call intellectuals, achieve considerable incomes" (Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 219).
45. The statistics on the composition of the present Senate are from *The New York Times*, 9 November 1958, p. 65, "Cap and Gown Win Favor of Voter — 3 Newly Elected College Professors to Join Faculty of 11 Current Senators." This article also points out that seven other Senators (six of them Democrats) are members of Phi Beta Kappa.
46. It is well recognized, however, that no upper class of modern times anywhere has made such large funds available for intellectual activity. Carnegie, Rockefeller, Stanford, Guggenheim, Ford, and others set new standards through their gifts to universities or through the establishment of foundations. Veblen and others have pointed to these munificent contributions as examples of conspicuous consumption. What is left out of this analysis is the

implication that the support of intellectual activities is assumed as conveying prestige to men of wealth. In his last years, Andrew Carnegie surrounded himself with intellectuals and artists, and concerned himself with their economic problems. In his letter of gift establishing the Carnegie Foundation, he stated that among its purposes was to "do and perform all things necessary to encourage, uphold, and dignify the profession of the teacher and the cause of higher education" (Claude C. Bowman, *The College Professor in America* [Philadelphia: privately printed, 1938], p. 57). In 1919 John D. Rockefeller followed in Carnegie's footsteps by giving \$50,000,000 toward a nation-wide movement to pay college teachers more adequately" (*ibid.*, p. 43). With few exceptions, wealthy Frenchmen, Britons, or Germans have not felt the need to support intellectual endeavors on a large scale.

47. E. Digby Baltzell, *Philadelphia Gentlemen* (Chicago: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958).
48. Richard Hofstadter has perceptively analyzed some of the sources of the leftward drift of the American intelligentsia in which "beginning slowly in the 1890's and increasingly in the next two decades, members of these professions deserted the standpat conservatism of the post-Civil War era to join the main stream of liberal dissent and to give it both moral and intellectual leadership." See *The Age of Reform, op. cit.*, p. 149, also pp. 148-163. See also William E. Leuchtenburg, "Anti-Intellectualism: An Historical Perspective," *Journal of Social Issues*, 1955, 9: 8-17.
49. Marcus Cunliffe, "The Intellectuals: II The United States," *Encounter*, May 1955, 4: 29.
50. See Merle Curti, *American Paradox* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1956).
51. The British socialists were attacked for following the theories of the impractical Fabian intellectuals, and the German Right has always been hostile to *Kathedersozialismus*. The fact that during most of the twentieth century we have not had many conservative intellectuals has made anti-intellectualism in the United States a natural weapon of the conservatives. But Richard Hofstadter reminds us correctly that American liberal politicians, like the radical opponents of Marx, can be equally intolerant of intellectual opposition. "Our history books tell us . . . that during the Populist-Bryan period the university professors who failed to accept the gold standard economics of the well-to-do classes were often victims of outrageous interference; they do not usually trouble to tell us that when the Populists captured Kansas they raised hob with the University of Kansas in much the same way that they complained of so bitterly when the shoe was on the other foot" (Richard Hofstadter, "Democracy and Anti-Intellectualism in America," *Michigan Alumnus Quarterly Review*, 1953, 59: 288).
52. Friedrich Engels, "On the History of Early Christianity," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *On Religion* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), p. 319. A more detailed account of anti-intellectual episodes within the European socialist movement may be found in John Spargo, "Anti-Intellectualism in the Socialist Movement: A Historical Survey," in *Side-*

- lights on Contemporary Socialism* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1911), pp. 67-106.
53. David Riesman, *op. cit.*, p. 15. Riesman is one of the few intellectuals to suggest that an important reason for the presence of anti-intellectualism is that "in the much more fluid and amorphous America of our time, *the writer, the artist, the scientist have become figures of glamour, if not of power.*" (My emphasis.) Lionel Trilling is another who has written about the high status of the American intellectual. See his "Mind and Market in Academic Life," *New Leader*, 9 February 1959, 19-23.
 54. The French writer R. L. Bruckberger has argued that "the American intellectual often tends to say that his country has failed him, that she will not give him the honor which is his due, and that he feels like a spiritual exile. *I wonder if the contrary is not true.* Perhaps the American intellectual has failed his country, and perhaps he is more deeply missed than is first apparent. . . . This misunderstanding would indeed be comic if a nation could get along without intellectuals. Yes, the American intellectuals should stop complaining about America. It would be more in order for America to complain about them" (Bruckberger, *op. cit.*, p. 70).
 55. Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
 56. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
 57. Morris Freedman, "The Dangers of Non-Conformism," *American Scholar*, Winter 1958-1959, 28: 25-32.
 58. In Britain, the London School of Economics, once regarded as a stronghold of the Labour Party, now contains a Conservative voting majority among its faculty, according to a number of reports. In Canada, the *Canadian Forum*, the organ of socialist writers and academics for three decades, ceased being a socialist magazine within the past five years. In Scandinavia one may point to similar changes.
 59. Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals and the Powers: Some Perspectives for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1958, 1: 8.